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The herein study presents an explanation of the high frequency of team production and high 
level of peer monitoring found in Japanese firms, in terms of a simple and empirically 
grounded variation in individual utility functions. We argue that Japanese agents are generally 
characterized by a higher degree, with respect to their Western counterparts, of aversion to 
unfavourable inequality, a feature which explains seemingly puzzling experimental evidence. In 
combination with long term employment and various organizational practices, this creates the 
conditions for obtaining willingness to exert mutual monitoring and peer pressure which 
facilitates the convergence towards cooperative equilibrium in dilemma type situations. 
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1. Introduction  
The free-riding problem in team production is one of the most well-known issues within the 
literature in economics and in social science in general. Since the classical work by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), it has become one of the typical examples of “market failure" connected to the 
“public good nature" of, in this case, the total output produced by a group, whose members 
receive a share which does not depend solely on their personal effort. As the cost of effort is 
born entirely by the individual, while the benefits are reaped by the whole group, we find that 
individual payoff maximization brings about an inefficiently low level of team production. 
This result rests on the standard assumption of a rather narrow definition of individual 
prederences, based only on a function of one's own result in term of a combination of 
compensation and effort. However, everyday evidence suggests the importance of social aspects 
related to working in a group. In particular, members who do provide a substantial effort 
typically feel resentful towards free-riders. On the other hand, the latter may feel guilty towards 
high contributors. These aspects are related to the concepts of shame and guilt, proposed as the 
two components of peer pressure proposed by Kandel and Lazear (1992). They show how peer 
pressure can overcome the free-riding problem in a context of profit sharing among partners in 
a small group. Their analysis is extended in Barron and Paulson Gjerde (1997), where a 
principal takes into account mutual monitoring and pressure among workers when designing 
incentive schemes. 
There is nowadays widespread experimental evidence that social aspects affect people's 
decisions in such a way that, in many contexts, own payoff maximization and perfect 
rationality perform quite poorly as sources of predictions for human behavior. That is the case 
even quite simple games, in which we can safely assume that the lack of perfect rationality is 
not the main issue. Among recent works, Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Andreoni et al. (2002) and 
Sefton et al. (2002) provide evidence of willingness to spend in order to punish free-riders even 
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in the last stage of a repeated game and in “stranger" conditions, where two opponents are not 
going to interact more than once and, therefore, strategic considerations are not behind this 
behavior. It is noteworthy how free-riders learn to cooperate, when given the chance to play 
the same game, even though with a different match. So we find that willingness to punish, one 
of the conditions for the effectiveness of the external part of peer pressure ("shame"), is often 
fulfilled. 
As for the internal pressure, guilt, we find that a number of agents adapt their contribution 
choices to their peers'. This is defined as the “conditional cooperative" behavior in Fischbacher 
et al. (2001) and Keser and Van Winden (2000). However, while it is clear that agents who 
cooperate when uninformed about others' behavior quickly withdraw their contributions in case 
of free-riding by the other members, less conclusive is the evidence about free-riders' desire to 
increase theirs in order to make it reach the group average (see, e.g., Brandts and Fatás, 2001). 
Overall experimental evidence on dilemma and public good games (see Ledyard, 1995) spurred 
new theories of human preferences which try to explain findings apparently at odds with 
“conventional" assumptions. Among the “social" or “other regarding" preferences, the ones 
which include inequity and inequality aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are compatible both with evidence which suggests equity or 
reciprocity as leading forces of behavior and with data which fits with “standard" kinds of 
preferences. In fact, in some settings even the inequality averse behaves in the same way a 
selfish would; more important for our purposes, in others it is the selfish who finds it 
worthwhile to behave “nicely". Especially in Fehr and Schmidt's analysis we find examples of 
this kind of outcomes as a result of interaction between the selfish and the fairness minded, for 
given (and experimentally tested) proportions in the population. 
A natural question arising in this respect is how different cultural contexts can bring about 
different outcomes in various aspects of social life. For instance some of our results are derived 
from modelling the cultural context as a provider of initial conditions in an evolutionary 
setting. The initial conditions are thought precisely as proportions of fairness minded agents in 
the population. We choose inequity aversion as the representation of “fairness orientation" for 
the strong experimental support it received and for the simplicity it provides in deriving 
predictions.
1 
Our analysis investigates the reasons for the emergence of peer pressure underlined by several 
scholars as a relevant and distinctive aspect of life within Japanese firms when compared to 
their “Western" counterpart. Common wisdom refers to the communitarian type of culture the 
Japanese society is embedded in as the driving force behind team cooperation and mutual 
monitoring as means to achieve it, while the more individualistic orientation typical of Western 
societies drives towards a system of incentives and control based on hierarchy and individual 
performance evaluation. We are going to show how these aspects can be studied and explained 
applying standard concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection (Nash, 1950; Selten, 
1975) based on simple and empirically grounded variations in the individual utility functions, 
while traditionally they are studied in more “holistic" terms. 
                                              
1 Other models propose to incorporate the reward and punishment of good and bad intentions, following Rabin 
(1993) seminal contribution. The main problem of these models (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) lies in their 
high complexity. We argue that the inequality aversion models are preferable as the loss of accuracy as predictors is 
very limited with respect to the advantage of their simplicity when compared to their intentions based counterparts.  
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More specifically, our results are based on critical parameters included in the utility functions, 
representing the aversion to inequity as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We are going to use 
assumptions on the different frequency, in Japan and in the “West", of certain critical levels of 
these parameters. These assumptions are based not just on what seems intuitive reasonable in 
the light of “group orientation" culture frequently mentioned to be stronger in Japan (we later 
discuss this point), but especially on empirical evidence arising from cross-cultural experiments. 
We find these experiments particularly useful for our purpose, as they permit to isolate aspects 
of behavior that are normally hard to disentangle with the multitude of elements which can 
potentially affect prominent features of field data. For example, evidence of high productivity 
in teams could be due to intrinsic desire to contribute, or to altruism, or fear to be punished by 
peers or by bosses; also, different situations in the specific workplace of a given country could 
play an important role. In the experimental lab it is possible isolate the effect of a punishment 
device available to group members, by comparing results between treatments where the 
presence or absence of such device is the only difference. Moreover, cross cultural experiments 
allow to make sets of individuals, whose main difference is the country where they live 
(university students are the usual subject pool), interact in similar environment under the same 
rules. In the next section we discuss about how the Japanese “orientation" towards group 
members needs to be carefully defined if one wants to be consistent with experimental 
evidence, and propose aversion to “being behind" as a plausible explanation. In section 3 we 
introduce the game we use in order to represent the interaction among team members. Section 
4 presents the results derived when players interact in couples and are averse only to 
unfavorable inequality. Section 5 deals with a more general case, where group size varies and 
aversion to favorable inequality also exists. In section 6 we discuss how results allow to 
reconcile experimental evidence with existing organizational practices in the Japanese firms. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Japanese vs "West": making sense of experimental evidence 
The research by Yamagishi and colleagues (see Yamagishi et al., 1998 and references therein) 
points out that the idea of the Japanese as people sharing a genuine tendency to enjoy 
grouping together and cooperate is misleading. In Yamagishi (1988b), in particular, we find that 
Japanese subjects cooperate substantially less than their American counterparts in a standard 
dilemma games, i.e. in a game where individual payoff maximation leads to defection and to 
payoff allocations that are Pareto dominated by the ones which would be achieved if everybody 
cooperated. These difference vanishes once a sanctioning system is introduced: cooperation 
increases only slightly among U.S. subjects, substantially in Japan. In Yamagishi (1988a) it is 
also observed that Japanese subjects are more prone to leave a group when they find other 
members to be less inclined or less able to cooperate, where in this case cooperation consists in 
completing a test correctly, as rewards are to be shared among team members. This evidence 
undermines the common perception of a higher group orientation in Japan, which seems 
consistent with the frequently observed feature of organizing production in teams. Yamagishi 
proposes an interesting explanation: it is exactly because of the strength of the ties that 
Japanese individuals develop in their life, in the family and in their firm, that they are not 
accustomed to trust others when the ties are weak. In particular, long term employment favors 
this tendency and the related low ability to form trustful relationships with strangers. The link 
between these “Japanese" traits and the experimental evidence lies precisely in the sanctioning 
possibilities, which are more readily available in “strong ties" relationships. On the other hand,  
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Yamagishi argues that this same sanctioning systems are responsible for undermining a 
voluntary basis for cooperation. 
Explaining the frequency of cooperation in working groups as motivated by individual utility 
functions in which the argument to maximize is group welfare appears to be inconsistent with 
the experimental evidence just mentioned. A more plausible explanation could be suggested by 
the frequency of punishment as leading to cooperation. In fact, this would also be consistent 
with the cultural origins of the large use of team production and related collective norms inside 
the Japanese firm, pointed out by Aoki (1988 and 2001). Aoki traces these origins in the 
egalitarian conventions fostering cooperation within and among villages - and the willingness 
to engage in bloody clashes in case of violations - for the control of water cultivation necessary 
for the cultivation of rice. 
In fact, a more recent experiment addresses this aspect more directly. Cason et al. (2004) 
propose a non-linear public game made of two stage. In the first, each of the two players have 
to decide whether to commit to zero cooperation or not. In the second, the player(s) who did 
not commit has to decide his cooperation level. The non-linear payoff function is such that 
own-payoff maximization implies that if both players reach the second stage, they both pick 8 
as contribution level in the Nash equilibrium. If only one player reaches that stage, he should 
pick a higher level, namely 11. Notice that payoffs are equal in the former case, and largely 
unequal in the latter, the zero contributor being obviously better off. The two pure strategy 
Nash equilibria involve one player's commitment to zero contribution, the other picking 11 in 
the second stage; in the mixed strategy equilibrium they both decide to commit to zero 
contribution with 0.32 probability. American data are consistent with the pattern of this last 
equilibrium, both in terms of the rate of participation to public good production (68%) and in 
second stage behavior: a player “should" contribute more when left as the only producer of a 
public good than when engaged in joint production. However, data show that when a Japanese 
player is left alone in the second stage, he typically decides to produce at a substantially lower 
level than the one maximizing his own payoff. As a consequence, the average payoff of players 
who commit to zero contribution is in fact lower than the average payoffs of players once they 
jointly reach the second stage. As the game is played repeatedly, this pattern causes the 
frequency of commitment to zero contribution to be lower in Japan, and this in turn makes 
average production of "public good" closer to the efficient levels and average payoffs higher 
than in the U.S. 
This result is consistent with the idea that Japanese people are relatively more willing to 
sacrifice their own interest to punish people who contribute less and to make payoff 
distribution more egalitarian. 
Among the model of social preferences, the ones which focus on the latter aspect have the 
advantage to be able to organize a large deal of experimental evidence in a very parsimonious 
way, in terms of parameter involved. In particular, the model in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is 
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As  π denote payoffs, α  measures the aversion to unfavorable inequality, or distaste to be 
“behind", β to favorable inequality, or distaste to be “ahead". We are going to explore in the 
following sections the relation between those parameters and the level of cooperation which 
can be attained in team production when a temptation of free-riding exists. Notice that, as the  
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model is presented by Fehr and Schmidt as incorporating inequity aversion, here the concept of 
inequity is reduce to inequality or, in other words, equitable outcomes are the ones where 
material payoffs are the same. This coincidence makes sense in reference to results in 
experiments, where subjects are ex ante equal (moreover they are typically all undergraduate 
students) and are randomly assigned their roles in the game to be played. In order to make the 
formulation in (1) valid in the more general contexts, where real effort decisions are taken, we 
are going to assume that effort can be expressed in monetary terms, so that the disutility it 
entails is equivalent to how much an individual would be willing to pay to lower his effort 
without any consequence on material payoffs. 
In our comparative perspective, it is crucial to understand how to interpret the low levels of 
cooperation among Japanese subjects when playing anonymously public good games in terms 
of parameter levels. One possibility would be to assume that pure selfishness (i.e. α=β=0) is 
more frequent among Japanese subjects. However, this idea would be in contradiction with 
Japanese agents' willingness to sacrifice their own interest in order to hurt defectors. The latter 
phenomenon can be explained in terms of higher frequency of high levels of α parameters. In 
fact, if a subject with a given payoff gets disutility from being worse off than another player, 
he is willing to punish her as long as the decrease in her payoff is higher than the amount he 
has to spend, if his  exceeds a critical level. On the other hand, in standard dilemma games high 
levels of α in the population do not foster cooperation, but rather reinforce the tendency to 
defect, as being the only cooperator implies disutility from being poorer than the opponents. 
Large presence of high-β individuals would appear to foster cooperation. This comes from the 
fact that defection may lead to disutility from being richer than those who cooperate. However, 
such type of individuals may still defect if they expect others to do the same; in fact, low levels 
of trust is, as we have seen, Yamagishi's explanation for his results in Japan. 
The elements forming peer pressure, a phenomenon typical of Japanese firms, high α's are a 
necessary condition for the “shame" effect, which occurs when individuals monitor each other 
and express contempt for free-riders; β is linked to “guilt", which may be felt by who 
cooperates less than his peers. Overall, we argue that experimental evidence speaks in favor of 
a comparatively higher frequency in Japan of individuals characterized by high levels of α, 
while we cannot at the moment draw definitive conclusions about cross-cultural differences in 
levels of β. As a consequence, we are going to concentrate especially on the possible effects of 
this difference in team production settings, characterized as “dilemma games". 
3. The team production game and peer sanctioning 
We are going to represent team production as characterized by the following payoff 
formulation for group members: 
    
   (2) 
      
where  j g  (constrained to be non-negative) is the contribution of a given player j and γ the 
public good production technology. 
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so that under standard assumptions about rationality and selfishness no positive g is chosen 
and this leads to Pareto inefficiency. 
This basic representation permits to highlight the free-rider problem in a somewhat more 
extreme fashion with respect to the case where the production and the effort cost functions are 
non-linear, so that individual effort is suboptimal but not absent. We choose this representation 
for sake of simplicity, as it captures the essence of the team production problem. The zero effort 
choice, moreover, should not be taken literally but rather as the minimum effort compatible 
with keeping the job. 
We employ a one-shot interaction setting both, again, for sake of simplicity and to represent an 
extreme case where cooperation is difficult to achieve. Of course in many situations workers do 
repeat their interaction; however, as long as the time horizon is finite, which is typically the 
case when working on a specific project or in a firm employing job rotation, backward 
induction leads to the emergence of equilibria characterized by free-riding. 
Job rotation is in fact one of the characteristics of the typical Japanese firm; for instance, Sako 
(1994) points out that “horizontal job transfers are also abundant, facilitated partly by the 
relative absence of occupational consciousness guarding task demarcation". Although job 
rotation does also take place within the same group, it also occurs, as Itoh (1994) mentions, that 
“extensive rotations enable them [the employees] to work in various departments, regional 
offices, or factories, and as a result there is little chance that they will work together in the 
same place, particularly in a large firm". So the rationale for the existence and effectiveness of 
mutual monitoring and sanctioning can hardly be based on “folk theorem" type of argument, as 
the team production game is not “infinitely" nor "indefinitely" repeated among the same group 
members. 
At the same time we argue that long term employment, a distinctive Japanese feature (see, 
among the other, Ouchi, 1981), does make a difference in the effectiveness of peer sanctioning. 
In particular, if an individual earns the reputation of being a free-rider, the damages he is going 
to suffer are obviously larger than what would be the case were he given the possibility to leave 
the firm at a low cost. This provides high possibility for hard working people to hurt fellow 
workers who shirked, even when this occurs in the last period of permanence in the same 
working team. Other features of the Japanese firm seem to be going in the same direction. 
Quality circles and team meeting, for instance, are indicated in Kandel and Lazear (1992) as 
mechanisms of investing in the peer pressure function. Also the participative decision making 
and the encouragement and organization by the company of social activities contribute to 
create an environment where peers can substantially affect each other’s well-being. This whole 
system of attributes contribute to create an effective “punishment technology" which is not 
available in standard “Western" organizations. As with the production of the public good, we 
take a linear form similar to the one proposed by other authors (see, for instance, Fehr and 
Gaechter, 2002, and Sefton et al., 2002), as it allows a rapid derivation of the basic intuitions 
about the consequences of social preferences. 
The punishment technology implies that a player can decrease the payoff of one or more 
opponents at his choice. We assume that to implement a reduction p of an opponent's payoff, a  
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player has to spend a quantity cp, with 0<c<1. So the final payoff function is determined as 
follows: 
 
   (3) 
where 
s
r p  are the punishment points inflicted by player r upon player s. The final payoff, then, 
is obtained subtracting the cost for punishing opponent and the damage of being punished by 
them. Naturally, all p terms are non-negative, as we do not allow transfers among agents. 
4. Unfavorable inequality aversion: α-positive players' behavior in a 
random matching environment 
In this section we focus on the effects of variations of α parameter in the preferences of players 
in the population, who are randomly matched in couples to play a one-shot game according to 
the rules just described above. We assume that β=0 always holds for all players and that each 
player is informed about the frequency of types in the population, but cannot observe his 
specific opponent's type. We will discuss later the consequence of allowing for positive β's and 
for larger groups. We also assume that a player's type does not affect his expectation about his 
opponent's, which is determined by the frequency in the population, which is approximately 
true if the population is large
2. 
If payoffs are determined as in 2), and if players are selfish (i.e.  = =0 α β ), all players choose 0. 
The equilibrium does not change if any number of players display positive α's. The best 
response when all opponents choose 0 remains 0: indeed, a positive contribution would give 
the player choosing it not only a lower payoff level, but also disutility from being behind with 
respect to his opponents. The best response to any positive numbers is also 0, as no disutility is 
derived from being ahead in the payoff distribution. So 0 is a dominant strategy and (0,0) is the 
Nash equilibrium. 
Things change if we assume that, after playing the voluntary contribution game, each player is 
given the possibility to reduce the payoff of his opponents according to the formulation in 3). 
As specified above, punishing entails a cost: a player i, in order to decrease the opponent's 
payoff by 
j
i p , has to spend 
j
i cp , with 0<c<1. This constraint on the cost function, also present 
in the above mentioned studies on the effects of punishment, is very important. On one hand, it 
is obviously positive, which implies, together with the one-shot structure of the game, that 
punishing unambiguously reduces the punisher's payoff. On the other, the upper bound 1 is 
such that the sacrifice for the punisher is lower than the damage for the punished. 
                                              
2 In a finite population, the probability of being matched with a certain type would be lower for a player of the same 
type than for a player of a different one, in an environment where the frequency is known. For instance, a type x in 
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What happens in the punishment phase? Clearly, players characterized by α=0 do not spend 
anything to punish. If a player is selfish, he does not take an action which reduces his own 
payoff, regardless of the possible effects on his opponent. As the only deviation from selfishness has 
to do with inequality aversion, punishment actions may only be taken a player who had contributed 
more than his opponent, as we rule out perverse equilibria of the punishment subgame, where for 
instance equality could be achieved with both players equally punishing each other after having 
chosen the same contribution level. An inequality averse player whose contribution was higher may 
decide to punish. Denoting players “1" and “2", we get the following definition of player 1's utility 
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    Clearly, two possibilities exists: either the player does not punish, or he does enough to 
equalize payoffs, for which it must be that: 
  0 ) 1 ( 1 ≥ − − c c α  







         ( 5 )  
This necessary condition becomes sufficient if we use the strict inequality. As could be 
expected, the threshold which makes players punish depends on the parameter c. Broadly 
speaking, if it is very costly to punish, a player does not do it unless his aversion to 
unfavorable inequality is very high. In particular, if c approaches the upper limit 1, which 
would imply that the cost for the punisher is almost the same as the damage for the punished, 
only an (implausible) infinite aversion to inequality would justify a punishment action. 
However, it is not the case that the higher c the better for free-riders without ambiguity. In fact, 
ceteris paribus a higher cost c implies that the magnitude of punishment required to equalize 
payoffs is greater, so if a player is punished, her payoff is reduced more than what would be the 
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which is of course increasing in c. Therefore, the higher c, the higher the minimum α which 
makes a higher contributor punish is opponent, but the higher the magnitude of punishment 
once it happens. 
4.1. Homogeneous players: subgame perfect equilibria and evolutionary analysis 







occurs and, expecting it, all players do not contribute anything. Things change if the common 
α  exceeds α . 
Proposition 1. If all players in the population are characterized by (5), then for every  [] 0,1 g ∈  
there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both players choose it as contribution 
level. 
Proof. First notice than any Nash equilibrium in the subgame following the contribution phase 
results in the equalization of payoffs. In fact the worse off player would otherwise have 
incentive to deviate from his strategy and increase his punishment action. 
Now take a strategy profile () 1 2 , s s
∗∗  in which both players pick a contribution level  1 , g
∗  player 
1 sets  
2
1 0 p = whenever  2 g g









 otherwise, player 2 sets  
1
2 0 p = whenever 









otherwise. This strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. First, it is indeed the case that in every possible subgame following the 
contribution phase payoffs are equalized, as required by subgame perfection. Moreover, given 
this punishment profile, no player has incentive to deviate from contributing  . g ∗ In fact, 
selecting  g g
∗ > cannot be profitable: it provides a lower payoff in the contribution game 
which gets lowered after punishing in order to avoid inequality. g
∗  is a better response as it 
gives a higher payoff in the contribution game and no inequality to be "corrected". 




g g g g U
−
−
− + + − =
1
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 always holds in this domain, so choosing g g
∗ <  cannot be part of an 
equilibrium as the player would always deviate by increasing his contribution. Q.E.D.  
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This result implies, in particular, that full cooperation, i.e. contribution 1 by both players, can 
be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
In the remainder of this section, we present an evolutionary analysis
3 based on the assumption 
that players are “programmed" to punish lower contributors as to make payoffs equal. Recall 
that we rule out perverse cases of punishment towards higher or equal contributors, that is 
equivalent to say that among the punishment profiles that lead to payoff equalization, they are 
able to coordinate to pick the least “destructive" one. With this assumption in mind, we can 
actually refer to contribution levels as “strategies". A first result stemming out of the previous 
proposition is that any contribution level is an evolutionarily stable strategy, as it is strictly 
best response to itself.
4 
So far we have found that, unlike what happens with purely selfish players, equilibria with 
positive contribution levels can be sustained on the basis of aversion to be behind which 
cannot be seen as a form of “altruism", or positive orientation towards peers as, instead, could 
be the case for β-positive players. Here the only way in which players can take others' welfare 
into account is “negative", in form of envy for the better off. The question remains about how 
to select a particular equilibrium. Let's assume, for simplicity, that players choose between two 
contribution levels, 0 or 1, as part of their strategy. Denoting  x Eπ  the expected payoff from 
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At this point we have a formal expression of the fact that a cooperator does better than a 







the latter punish defectors harshly enough to overcompensate savings on contribution. On the 
other hand, a defector does relatively better with another defector as not only he saves on 





                                              
3 See Maynard Smith (1982) and Maynard Smith and Price (1973) for a description of the basic foundations of 
evolutionary game theory. 
4Indeed, if we allow strategies which do not include punishing, then we find that contributing the same quantity but 
not punishing can invade a population of players contributing 
* g  and punishing lower contributors. In fact, both 
strategies produce the same expected payoffs. But then, if the non-punishing strategy gets spread, it is possible for 
free-riding strategies to "invade" the population, if the frequency of punishers gets low.  
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Notice that 0 11 , cyy c <+ − <+ so that  1 01 . p
∗ <<  Therefore there always exists a threshold 
such that cooperation has a higher expected value than defection if and only if the frequency 
of cooperation exceeds that threshold. It is immediate to see that the higher γ, the lower the 
threshold (recalling  1 c < ). As we could expect, the higher the benefit from the public good, the 
lower the benefit from free-riding and the easiest to achieve the condition for making 




















γ > That is, the higher the cost of punishing, which is born by a cooperator 
when meeting a defector, the hardest it is to meet the condition for cooperation to be the best 
value choice. 
Using the concept of replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), we have: 
  ) )( 1 ( 0 1 1 1 1 π π ρ ρ ρ E E − − = 
 
So  11 pp
∗ >  is the condition for cooperation to spread across the population, until full 
cooperation,  1 1, p = is reached. On the contrary, defection spreads if  11 pp
∗ <  while if  11 pp
∗ =  
the frequency of cooperation remains stable. 






is sufficiently cooperative, the availability of a punishment device makes cooperation 
spread over the population. In particular, an initial condition of full cooperation is sufficient to 
foster the reproduction of this state, although not necessary. In absence of a punishment device, 
instead, if a “mutant" strategy of defection entered the population it would provide higher 
payoffs and therefore be imitated and drive away cooperation. Clearly, the same would occur in 
presence of the punishment device, but with levels of disadvantageous inequality aversion not 
high enough to make players be willing to punish. 
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Summing up, we have seen that, unlike in standard prisoner dilemmas, initial levels of 
cooperation matter. Namely, as ceteris paribus cooperators (contributing 1) do relatively better 
the higher the cooperation frequency, the initial level of cooperation is decisive in determining 
towards which evolutionarily stable equilibrium the population will converge. 
4.2. Heterogeneous players 
We now consider the possibility that players differ in their α parameter, and find the following 
result: 







exceeds() () 1 1 , c γ −− then there exists a subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium with equal 
contribution level, for any possible value of this level. 






 decide to punish according to 6), 






 do not exert any punishment. These punishment strategies are 
compatible with subgame perfection. Then for any level g
∗  the best response for any player is 
to select the same contribution. We know that a level g g
∗ >  cannot be best response to g
∗  
(see proof of Proposition 1 above). Focusing on contributions g g
∗ < , we find that the 
expected utility of replying  g  to  g
∗  is given by: 
  c
g g
g g g g U
−
−
− + + − =
1






           c g
U
−








So, if  () () 11 c α θγ >− − the expected utility is always increasing in the contribution level, 
therefore a contribution level 
* g g <  cannot be the expected value maximizer. We therefore 
find that the best response to 
* g  is 
* g   itself. Q.E.D. 
So we find that if the presence of players with a sufficiently high α reaches a critical level, the 
chances to be punished makes a lower contribution a “wrong" choice. Notice that, once we are 
excluding as possible best reply a higher contribution (which could only be compatible with 
some forms of altruism or efficiency oriented preferences), the expected utility U(g) is the same 
both for selfish and for α-positive players themselves. In other words, their presence "discipline" 
both selfish and their own type, discouraging free-riding if the opponent cooperates. 
Under these conditions, we find that any combination of equal contribution levels constitute a 
subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This result is a natural complement to Proposition 
1, where players were assumed to be all characterized by the same aversion to unfavorable 
inequality, which makes them punish in case of being worse off. Here we ask for less, as the 
threshold  ) 1 )( 1 ( c − −γ  is obviously lower than one. Notice that it is decreasing in γ, which is  
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not surprising: the higher γ, the lower the temptation to free-ride. More interestingly, it is also 
decreasing in c. This is related to the fact that, as pointed out earlier, the higher c, the bigger 
the magnitude of punishment once it occurs. So a high c makes it harder to meet the condition 






α , in a given individual, but it reduces the proportion of 
people sharing this feature that is necessary for the existence of cooperative equilibria, as 
punishment is heavier for lower contributors. 
The analysis of evolutionary stability changes when not all players share the same high level of 
α. In particular, it makes it harder to meet the condition  0 0 1 > − π π E E , as now the defector 
may go unpunished even if he meets a cooperator. The only modification in analysing this 
condition is, in fact, that the probability that a cooperator prefers to punish is lower than 1. Of 
course, the fact that a player who has defected may be averse or not to unfavorable inequality 
is not relevant, as he does not punish in any case. 















− − + = γ ρ γ ρ π
 
The expected payoff from defection does change. Denoting by ω the probability that a 






α  we get: 
 
1 ) - (1   )
1
1






As in principle any frequency of cooperation and any relationship between cooperation and 
type is admissible as initial, exogeneous condition, we remain agnostic about the specific value 
ω may take, but it is clear that if the lower ω the higher  0 π E . 












Clearly, if  1 < ω  the new threshold is higher. As a matter of fact, if  (1) ( 1), c ω γ <− +  we get 
that the threshold is higher than 1, so that it cannot be reached by any initial cooperation level. 
About low α players, it is easy to see that while their expected payoff of defecting is the same 
as for the high α players, their expected payoff of cooperating is higher, as they do not undergo 
the cost of punishing if they meet a defector. Therefore, 
* *
1 1 ρ ρ >  is sufficient to ensure that 
these players have a higher expected payoff from cooperation than from defection. 
For what we have seen, if we assume that in a population where original preferences are stable, 
but the frequency of choices between cooperation and defection is allowed to vary according to  
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the replicator dynamics described above, the removal of the assumption that all players share a 
high α makes it harder, or even impossible, to meet the condition for spreading cooperation. 
4.3. Playing sequentially 
We have seen that the presence of a proportion of players willing to punish to avoid 
unfavorable inequality creates the existence of equilibria, where contribution levels are the 
same. This result is a relevant change with respect to dilemma games under standard 
assumptions of selfish preferences, but we are left with the problem of equilibrium selection. 
While we have showed the conditions under which evolutionary forces can lead to cooperation, 
here we propose an intuitive variation of our dilemma game, where one player moves first. In 
some settings both players interacting ignore the opponent's choice, but in many situations the 
timing is different: for instance, when the tasks are intrinsically sequential, which is not 
infrequent in team production. 
In our game, we get the following: 
Proposition 3. If  (1) ( 1), c α θγ >− −  and if players characterized by (5) punish according to 
(6), then the only equal contribution level which is part of subgame perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, when players choose contributions sequentially, is the maximum contribution. 
Proof. We have seen in Proposition 2 that if these assumptions are met, the best reply to any 
contribution level is to equalize it. Knowing that the second mover will do so, and that 
therefore no inequality will arise, the first mover's problem can be written, as max1 2 .




> γ , the argument is increasing in g. Q.E.D. 
Recall that we are assuming that the preferences in the population are common knowledge, 
unlike the ones of any specific individuals. So, as  (1) ( 1), c α θγ >− −  i.e. the probability that a 
given player is willing to punish if the opponent contributes less than himself exceeds a critical 
level, the second mover prefers to equalize the first mover's contribution. That is, her belief 
about the chances that the first mover is a high α type leads to this strategy. As the first mover 
is sure about the fact that his choice will be equalized, he decides to contribute the maximum 
level regardless of his own type. What really counts is that he believes that the second mover 
assigns a sufficiently high probability to the fact that he is a high α type, so that she believes 
that contributing less is a bad idea. 
5. Effects of group size and aversion to being ahead 
5.1. The N players case 
We now explore how things change in the more general case where group size can take 
different values. 
The formulation in (1) shows that the disutility player i derives from the fact that another 






 As a consequence, as we move from the  2 = N  
case to the possibility of larger groups, we find that a player suffers less for a single case of a  
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richer opponent. This, of course, has implications on his willingness to spend to reduce her 








precisely, in the punishment stage, for player i to be willing to punish it must be that the utility 







 compensates the cost c. However, this necessary 
condition is not sufficient: it might be that by spending c player i  increases the 
disadvantageous inequality with respect to all other players. We will get back to this point 
shortly. As we could intuitively expect, cooperative equilibria do exist also in N-size groups 
formed out of a population with homogeneous players sharing a sufficiently high level of 
unfavorable inequality aversion: 
Proposition 4.  Assume that all players in an N-size group are characterized 







α . Then for any contribution level 
* g  there exists a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium where all players contribute 
* g  as part of their strategy. 
Proof. First, it is clear that no players have incentive to contribute more than  . g ∗  Consider a 
downward deviation by player i. In the subgame following the contribution phase, as 










 for all 
} ,..., 1 , 1 ,..., 1 { N i i k + − ∈ such that all final payoffs are equalized. This strategy profile 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the subgame. In fact, no player has incentive to deviate 
increasing his punishment towards i, as this would imply an additional cost and no higher 











. We get: 

















by assumption.   
Clearly, if the players who contribute 
* g  play the profile just shown, the downward deviation 
by player i is not profitable. In fact, for any 









− − + + − = N
c N
g g


















   Q.E.D. 
We already pointed out that, for a given c, the level of inequality aversion sufficient to justify 







α . However, it is also clear that the 
“punishment profile" is not the unique equilibrium in the subgame following a defection. In  
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 in this case, a single 
player has no incentive to be the only one engaging in punishment even if he is infinitely 
inequality averse. This comes from the fact that punishment by a single player makes him 
suffer from inequality towards all those players who do not punish and therefore do not bear a 
related cost. So, the marginal effect of increasing punishment on unfavorable inequality is 
) 2 ( 1 − − − N c c  where the latter term involve the non-punishing players.








 then the best response by a highly inequality averse player to zero punishment by 
all the other cooperative players is to punish also them, besides the defector, to equalize all 
payoffs. 
5.2. The  0 > β  case 
In the two-player case where the contribution game is played simultaneously, cooperative 
equilibria can be sustained even without punishment opportunities when players are 
characterized by  γ β − ≥1 . In fact, in terms of utility levels, this change makes our game lose 
the feature of a “prisoner dilemma" as players genuinely prefer to cooperate as much as their 
opponent do so, as they would suffer from advantageous inequality created by contributing 
less. Therefore, any contribution profile including the same contribution is part of a Nash 
equilibrium in a standard public good game. Of course the presence of punishment 
opportunities does not change this result: when agents pick the same contribution level no 
punishment occurs, irrespective of players' levels of α. 
If instead  γ β − <1  there is no substantial change in the previous equilibrium analysis: free-
riding dominates in the standard public good game while punishment opportunities can sustain 
cooperative equilibria if combined with sufficiently high α's. 
In terms of evolutionary analysis nothing changes, as it is assumed that strategies spread 
according to payoff levels, rather than to utility levels.
6 So, in the game including punishment α 
does play a role in determining payoff differentials between cooperators and defectors, as the 
latter's payoff may be reduced in the punishment phase, but the possible internal feeling of 
guilt suffered by free-riders is irrelevant for the spreading out of cooperation or defection. 
When players are assumed to be heterogeneous, it is still the case that a selfish player's best 
response to any cooperation level is to free-ride completely unless he expects with more than 
) 1 )( 1 ( c − −γ  probability to encounter a player characterized by  ) 1 )( 1 ( c − −γ , in which case he 
would rather equalise his contribution level. Whether he expects to meet a high β type is 
irrelevant for his choice. On the other hand, we stated above that a player with  γ β − ≥1  
always prefers to meet his opponent's contribution level. The fact that, in a population with a 
                                              
5 In general, an equilibrium with punishment in the subgame following the first phase can only be sustained if (1) m 














6 If that were the case, we would find again that cooperation sustains itself, as high  players would be satisfied with 
cooperative choices if and only if they were matched with other cooperators.  
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proportion of high α players exceeding  ) 1 )( 1 ( c − −γ , it is still the case that any profile 
including the same contribution level can be characterized as a subgame perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium holds a fortiori if some agents are characterized by high β. If the high-α proportion 
is lower, the presence of high β players does not make cooperative equilibria arise in those 
interactions involving players with γ β − <1 , whose choice is to free-ride in any case. 
When the game is played sequentially, instead, the presence of high β players can potentially 
affect the behavior of all types of agents. In the previous analysis we have seen that a player 
chooses the maximal level of contribution if he expects his opponent to believe that the 
probability that he (the first mover) would punish a lower contribution is high. Now we have an 
alternative route to full cooperation in the sequential public good game: a first mover could 
contribute 1 if he expects the second mover to be a high β player, namely that she has a 





− 7 In fact, in that case the expected return from 
contributing 1 is the highest possible as a β player would “return the favor". Of course, only 
real β players do, while all the others free-ride irrespectively of first mover's choice. Summing 
up, in the sequential case we find that if the frequency of α players is high enough (recall we 
found  ) 1 )( 1 ( c − −γ as the threshold frequency) both first and second movers pick the maximum 
contribution in equilibrium, irrespectively of their actual type and of the β values in the 
population. If the frequency of high α players is not high enough, then first movers still pick 1 






 but only actual high β types equalise this 
contribution levels, while the others pick 0. 
    Interesting changes with respect to the previous analysis are created in the N-players case. 
The basic result follows: 







) 2 ( ) 1 ( β α
 then for any 
value  [] 1 , 0
* ∈ g  there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where all players pick 
[] 1 , 0
* ∈ g  as their contribution level. 
 
Proof. We show that in case all players pick 
* g  except for one player who selects a lower level, 
there exists a Nash equilibrium in the subgame following the contribution phase where all the 
others  1 N −  players punish the lower contributors in such a way that all final payoffs are 
equalised. Assume that player j has contributed 
*, g  player i a lower level and that all the other 










 such that if also j takes the 




i p p <  the following holds: 
                                              








where q is the probability that the second 
mover is characterized by a high ß, which implies that she would equalize his contribution.  
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i p p < , all the other 
players except for the lower contributors are worse off than i, therefore any additional unit of 
j
i p  reduces the inequality between i and every agent among the  ) 2 ( − N  “punishers" by c, the 
cost born by i. Therefore it is a best response by player i in the subgame to issue the same level 
of punishment 
j
r p , and by extension no player among the  ) 1 ( − N who contribute 
* g  have 
incentive to deviate from the level of punishment 
j
r p . A punishment profile where this is their 
choice (while of course the lower contributor does not punish anybody) is a Nash equilibrium in 
this subgame. But in this case it cannot be optimal for the j player to issue a lower level of 
contribution, as for sure the payoff after the punishment phase is lower than what he would 
achieve by contributing  , g∗ and in both cases all payoffs end up at the same level (so no 
disutility from inequality is suffered). 
So any strategy including 
* g  as contribution level is a best response to the strategy profile by 
the remainder of the players which include, for all of them, contributing 
* g and then 
punishment 
j
r p  in case one player contributed less. In particular this holds for the strategy 
including 
* g  and 
j
r p  as punishment in case of one single lower contributor, which is then best 
response to itself and part of a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
We had seen previously how increasing the group size had unambiguously "bad" effects in 
achieving cooperation based on fear of punishment, when  0 = β . Now we see that if we allow 
for the existence of aversion to advantageous inequality, or "guilt", we find that the perspective 
of a "collective punishment" equilibrium following free-riding by one player is less 


















α  we have when assuming  0. β =  

















i β α α
 
Therefore, we get that the effect of group size on the marginal utility of punishment is positive 
if  ( ) 0. c αα β −+ + >  This implies that if the cost of punishment is high then it may indeed be 
easier to achieve a cooperative equilibrium sustained by punishment possibilities in a large 
group. The reason is, that a high cost implies a big disutility from advantageous inequality 
when a player's coworker are punishing a free-rider. This result is somewhat in line with the 
intuition that when punishment is very costly it may be better to be able to share its burden 
with other coworkers; this structure makes it clear the relevance of "guilt" to sustain this aspect 
of punishment. Clearly, all these results are based on the assumption that contributions, or  
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effort levels, are perfectly observable, an assumption which could be hard to meet if the group 
gets very large. 
6. Inequality aversion, cooperation, cultural differences and 
organizational practices: a discussion 
We started off arguing that experimental evidence casts doubt on the general idea that 
Japanese people share a higher “cooperative attitude" when compared to Western subjects. In 
fact, evidence was found where cooperation rates in standard public good games where even 
lower in Japan. This seems at odd, at first sight, not only with “common wisdom" but especially 
with the fact that in Japan it is common to organize production in teams, a practice which may 
in principle create free-riding problems. It is also well known that Japanese team production 
goes hand in hand with mutual monitoring and peer pressure among group members. Indeed, 
additional experimental evidence shows a higher tendency in Japan to be willing to spend in 
order to punish free-riding and in general behavior which can be regarded as “exploitative". It 
remains to be explained why agents exert pressure when it is costly to do so. An explanation 
solely based on higher future benefits from stimulating cooperation by previous “defectors" is 
not compatible with the finiteness of the interaction among group members; indeed, 
punishment occurs also in experiments where the number of repetitions is announced. 
We referred to the formulation in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) due to its simplicity and its 
compatibility with a wide array of experimental evidence. Then we interpreted the differences 
found in Japanese agents' behavior as based on higher aversion to unfavorable inequality (the 
α parameter). Our formal analysis showed that indeed cooperative equilibria exist even in one-
shot games when punishment opportunities are provided, under suitable assumptions 
combining α and the “punishment technology". In two-player interactions, this is due to the 
threat of punishment which makes any contribution level the best response to itself. Moreover, 
we find that in an evolutionary setting the initial frequency of cooperation is critical for its 
diffusion across the population, again in case players' α is high enough. Then we extended our 
analysis to the heterogeneous players case, to the possibility that aversion to favorable equality 
also exists and to the N-player case. In all those cases we find conditions including inequality 
aversion as a necessary condition for achieving cooperative equilibria among the possible ones. 
It is then clear that providing punishment possibilities is not per se welfare enhancing. In a 
homogeneous players setting where the level of α is low punishment possibilities will not be 
used; the same holds in a heterogeneous environment if the proportion of high α players is not 
sufficient to make cooperation the best response to itself, and as a consequence free-riding 
prevails.
8 As it is possibly costly for a firm to set up meetings, social activities, a long term 
employment structure beyond optimality requirement, then it makes sense to set-up a 
“punishment technology" only when inequality aversion levels in the population are high. This 
could be an explanation for the Japanese tendency to organize production in group, not related 
to differences with respect to Western firms concerning the team production technology. 
Indeed, our results hold even if we assumed that 1/ , N γ < with the exception of the equilibrium 
in the sequential contribution case. While it is clear that in general  N / 1 > γ  is a reasonable 
                                              
8 Notice, however, that in equilibrium it does not occur that inequality averse agents cooperate, so that we do not get 
welfare reduction due to punishment actions.  
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assumption when production is arranged in teams, what we find is that neither the efficiency 
nor the immediate consequence of team production on individual salaries are the driving forces 
of our results. What really matters is the fact that a cooperator dislikes an outcome where the 
free-rider is better off because of not having exerted a costly effort.
9 
7. Conclusions 
Our analysis shows a simple way to reconcile seemingly contradictory evidence of low 
cooperation of Japanese subjects in dilemma experiments and the tendency by Japanese firms 
to organize production in teams. We argue that typical Japanese organizational practices, such 
as long term employment, team meetings and quality circles, various social activities in which 
workers are encouraged to participate and so forth, contribute to create opportunities to punish 
those agents who do not cooperate to team production as much as their peers. Punishment as 
an action implying a cost for the enforcer but a higher one for its recipient is a simple way of 
thinking about one aspect of “peer pressure", often referred to as another distinctive trait of the 
Japanese working environment. The idea of “shame" proposed by Kandel and Lazear (1992) is 
based on the monitoring effort by peers and an action of exerting pressure which creates a 
disutility for the recipient. Indeed evidence from “cross-cultural" experiments points out that 
Japanese subjects do punish more when confronted with uncooperative behavior. On the other 
hand, no clear evidence has been found on differentials in “guilt", the part of peer pressure 
related to internal negative feelings suffered by free-riders independently of being monitored 
by their coworkers. 
One effect of different levels of cooperation is that, when the benefits of team production are 
equally shared, a free-rider is better off than a high contributor. We apply the idea of inequality 
aversion to express the distaste the latter feels when comparing his own payoff - with a 
monetary transformation of the disutility caused by effort - with the former's. Then we relate 
the tendency to punish, an action which reduces inequality, with the egalitarian culture 
Japanese agents are embedded in. We use the formulation in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
assume that Japanese players are distinguishable for a high level of aversion to unfavorable 
inequality. This leads us to investigate the role of this parameter in making cooperative 
equilibria possible. We find the following results: 
                                              
9 Recall that we are assuming throughout the paper that we can express the cost of effort in monetary terms, as it is 
in principle possible to evaluate it as the money a player would be willing to spend not to exert it. Then the 
application of inequality aversion, more often related to income levels, becomes intuitive.  
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•  In a random matching set-up with homogeneous preferences, high α lead to the existence 
of cooperative equilibria. Moreover, any contribution level, including the highest, is an 
evolutionary stable strategy once we assume players do punish in the second phase as 
their utility functions command. 
•  In the heterogeneous players case, any level of equal contribution can be part of a 
subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if the proportion of players with a 
sufficiently high α reaches a given threshold. 
•  If the contribution game is played sequentially, and the same conditions as in the 
previous points hold, then the only contribution profile which can be part of a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium is the maximum level for both players. 
•  Increasing group size makes the emergence of cooperative equilibrium more difficult as 
long as we assume that players are not averse to favorable inequality. However, if we 
drop this assumption then increasing the size can have positive effects under 
appropriate conditions, as long as all contribution levels are perfectly observable by all 
group members. 
•  The other way positive levels of β can affect previous results occurs when they reach 
levels high enough, such that cooperation is a best response to itself irrespective of 
punishment opportunities, which of course implies that utility functions change the 
“prisoner dilemma" aspect of the public good game. 
Overall, we have shown a variety of ways in which the aversion to being worse off than 
opponents can favor cooperation, when punishment opportunities are given. We maintain that 
what we find is consistent with the combination of that part of the Japanese cultural aspect of 
egalitarianism which is confirmed by experimental evidence and relevant organizational 
aspects observed in Japanese firms. Indeed, also the observed low levels of cooperation in 
standard dilemma experiments among Japanese subjects is totally compatible with high levels 
of unfavorable inequality aversion, as a player with high α has indeed one more reason to free-
ride, based on the risk which cooperation entails of being worse off than his opponent. If, 
instead, punishment opportunities are given, as in the case of the typical Japanese firm, then 
cooperation can be sustained even in absence of “positive" feelings towards peers. The latter 
here are included as a possibility in terms of aversion to favorable inequality, a phenomenon 
still under debate. We find that adding positive β's has indeed important implications in terms 
of the effects of group size, as increasing it may foster cooperation in the punishment phase, 
while when all players are averse only to unfavorable inequality increasing group size 
undermines punishment behavior. 
This contribution proposes one aspect at the basis of cooperation which is culturally based and 
is sustained via organizational practices and a general system of attributes of the Japanese firm. 
A consequence of this analysis is that these practices and attributes are not the best solution for 
any social and cultural environments, so that differences among Japan and Western countries 
could resist for a very long time. However, if some sort of “cultural convergence" occurs as 
societies are increasingly less isolated, things may change. For instance, a system of control 
based on peer pressure may lose effectiveness in the Japanese firm if individualism spreads 
across its members creating, among other effects, an envy-free environment; on the other hand, 
the same system may be effective in those Western contexts where significant frequency and 
intensity of “social preferences" emerge.  
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